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INTRODUCTION
Moldova is the poorest country in Europe and it is enmeshed in a
seemingly intractable separatist conflict involving ethnic tensions, Russian
troops, Soviet-era arms stockpiles, smuggling, money-laundering, and
corruption. Bordering Romania and Ukraine, with a majority of ethnic
Romanians, it is a country that has been largely overlooked by the West.1 This
report examines the key legal issues of this "frozen" conflict and assesses the
legal or quasi-legal arguments made by the Government of Moldova and the
separatists.
At issue is who should control a strip of land nestled between the Dniestr
River and the border of Ukraine. Variously called Transnistria, Trans-Dniester
and, by Russian speakers, Pridnestrov'ia,2 this region is less than 30 kilometers
wide, with 4,118 square kilometers in total area, making it roughly the size of
Rhode Island. Transnistria has a population of approximately 580,000, while
the rest of Moldova has 3.36 million inhabitants.4 Nonetheless, Transnistria
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I. The Soviets, however, labeled this population as ethnically "Moldovan," and asserted that they
were not ethnically Romanian. The USSR also called the Romanian language "Moldovan," and underscored
this by outlawing the use of the Latin alphabet and requiring the use of Cyrillic letters. Although the reason
for this nomenclature was political, rather than ethno-linguistic, it was carried over by the current Moldovan
government after independence.
2. CHARLES KING, THE MOLDOVANS: ROMANIA, RUSSIA, AND THE POLITICS OF
CULTURE 178 (2000).
3. Id., at 178.
4. U.S. Department of State 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for the Republic
of Moldova (hereafter "Moldova 2004 Country Report"), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2004/41697.htm; a Transnistrian census from November 2004 set Transnistria's population at approximately
555,500, which could indicate the ongoing flight of people from the region. Preliminary Results of the Census
in Transnistria, Olvia-press (Tiraspol) Sept. 7,2005. By contrast, a 1989 census found the region's population
to be 679,000.
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contains Moldova's key industrial infrastructure, power plants, and,
importantly, a significant stockpile of Soviet-era arms. Since 1994, it has been
under the effective control of a separatist regime that calls itself the
Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR).5
In late May 2005 the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (NY
City Bar), through its Special Committee on European Affairs (Committee) sent
a legal assessment team (Mission) to the Republic of Moldova, including
Transnistria. The Mission consisted of Barrington D. Parker, Jr., a United
States Circuit Court Judge in the Second Circuit; Robert Abrams, a partner at
Strrock & Stroock & Lavan LLP and former Attorney General of the State of
New York; Elizabeth Defeis, Professor of Law and former Dean of Seton Hall
University Law School; and Christopher J. Borgen, Assistant Professor of Law
at St. John's University School of Law. It was led by Mark A. Meyer, a
member of Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., and the Chair of the Committee.
As will be described below, the Mission met with the key policy leaders
in Moldova and in the breakaway region, including the President of Moldova
and the leader of the Transnistrian separatists, and has completed the first
independent analysis of the legal issues involved in the Transnistrian crisis.
Beholden to none of the stakeholders, the NY City Bar is able to consider these
issues from an objective standpoint. One should note that the NY City Bar's
work historically has not been confined to New York. In fact, the Transnistria
mission is not the first foreign mission by a committee of the Association. Over
the past twenty-five years, the Association has conducted a number of missions
to places as diverse as Cuba, Singapore, Malaysia, Turkey, Hong Kong,
Argentina, Uganda, Northern Ireland, and, most recently, India. In addition, the
Association has worked with bar organizations in the Czech Republic and
Kyrgyzstan to bolster the independence of the bar and judiciary. Perhaps due
to this historical involvement in international law, the various interested parties,
including the governments of Moldova, Russia, Romania, Ukraine, and the
United States, as well as the Leadership of Transnistria, assisted the Mission by
making government representatives, policymakers and experts available for
interview. In preparation of this Report, the Mission met with the following
individuals, as well as many others not listed here:
5. This report will use the "Transnistria" nomenclature although when we quote another author's
work we will preserve that author's nomenclature within the quotation. For example, the TMR may variously
be referred to as the Dniestr Republic, the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR), Transdniestria, or other
such name based on the nomenclature adopted by the author being quoted. Similarly, this report's spelling
of other proper names normally spelled in the Cyrillic alphabet may differ from the spellings within the





Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev
Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan
Minister of Reintegration Vasilii Sova
Chairperson of the Supreme Court Valeria Sterbert
Chairperson of the Constitutional Court Victor Puscas
Justice Minister Victoria Iftodi
General Ion Ursu, Chief of the Information and Security Services
Leaders of all of the Parliamentary factions
Deputy Attorney General Valeriu Gurbulea
Deputy Speaker of the Parliament Maria Postoico
US Ambassador Heather Hodges
Russian Ambassador Nicolay Ryabov
Ukrainian Ambassador Petro Cealyi
Romanian Ambassador Filip Teodorescu
OSCE Ambassador William Hill
ABA/CEELI Country Director Samantha Healy
Farmers and local municipal and county leaders from the Dubasari area
In Transnistria
President Igor Nikolaevich Smirnov
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Grigoriy Stepanovich Marakutsa6
Foreign Minister Valeriy Anatolevich Litskai
Minister of Justice Viktor Balala, Chairperson of the Constitutional Court
Vladimir Grigoriev
In Romania
Foreign Minister Mihai Ungureanu
Experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Trade and Economy
US Deputy Chief of Mission Tom Delare
In New York
Ambassador Andrey Denisov
Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations Ambassador
Seva Grigore
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the United
Nations Ambassador Mihnea Motoc
6. Marakutsa, who had been in office since the original separatist conflict, was replaced in
December 2005 with the election of Yevgeny Shevchuck as the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.
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Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations Senior
representatives of the Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations
In Washington, D.C.
Ambassador Stephen Mann, Special Negotiator for Eurasian Conflicts
Elizabeth Rood
Deputy Director
Office of the Special Negotiator for Eurasian Conflicts
The National Security Council's Director for Europe
Damon Wilson Various Department of State experts on Moldova and
regional conflicts Ambassador Sorin Ducaru
Romania's Ambassador to the United States and his staff Ambassador
Mihai Manoli
Moldova's Ambassador to the United States and his staff
The resulting report has five parts. In Part I we review the history of the
conflict over Transnistria. Part II is an overview of the work of the Mission of
the European Affairs Committee of the New York City Bar regarding the
situation in Transnistria. Part III turns to the substantive question of
determining the status of the so-called "Transnistrian Moldovan Republic"
(TMR) under international law. This will include discussions of self-deter-
mination, secession, and the status of defacto regimes. Part IV considers what
the TMR may or may not do regarding the conversion of property. Part V
assess the legal duties of third parties that become involved in secessionist
conflicts. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the main points of this report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report considers three main legal issues:
a) Whether the TMR has a right under international law to
autonomy or possibly sovereignty;
b) What the legal concerns are regarding the transfer of
property located in Transnistria by the TMR leadership;
and
c) What role "third-party" States have in the ongoing conflict
and, in particular, the international legal implications of




The Status of the TMR under International Law
The central question to this report concerns the status of the TMR under
international law and, in particular, the evaluation of claims by Transnistrian
leaders that the TMR has a legal right either to autonomy within Moldova or to
secede. We found neither claim persuasive and conclude that the TMR is best
characterized as a "de facto regime."
No Right to Autonomy
First, under international law there is no "right" to fiscal or governmental
autonomy within a state. While the TMR leadership may make political argu-
ments that one may or may not find persuasive, we did not find a legal basis for
a claim of autonomy. The two strongest quasi-legal arguments in favor of
autonomy are: a) That due to the denunciation by the USSR of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, which had established the modem boundaries of Moldova,
Transnistria should revert to an autonomous state; and, b) self-determination as
a basis for autonomy. The denunciation argument is a chimera. Simply
denouncing a treaty does not revert the political system to the status quo ante;
it merely means that the treaty will not be in force going forward. This is
especially true in treaties that include boundary delimitation provisions.
The second argument made by the Transnistrians, linking autonomy with
the right of self-determination, opens up numerous complex issues in public
international law. One thing is clear: rather than a right to autonomy--or even
a specific set of characteristics that define this term-intemational law in the
last century has focused on the elucidation of the norm of self-determination.
Self determination, and its relation to autonomy and secession, is discussed at
greater length below.
In sum, we found that international law has little to say as to any supposed
"right" to autonomy, and that grants of "autonomy" are largely issues of
domestic law. In the Transnistrian case, the Government of Moldova has
proposed various plans that are effectively grants of varying levels of
policymaking and regulatory autonomy; all have been rejected by the TMR.
We conclude that, based on their words and deeds, the TMRs leaders seem less
interested in autonomy than in full sovereignty.
Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and Secession
The norm of self-determination is not a general right of secession. It is the
right of a people to decide on their culture, language, and government. It has
evolved into the concepts of "internal self-determination," the protection of
minority rights within a state, and "external self-determination," secession from
2008]
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a state. While self-determination is an internationally recognized principle,
secession is considered a domestic issue that each state must assess itself.
Influential decisions and reports concerning self-determination, such as the
report concerning the status of the Aaland Islands in 1921 and the Badinter
Commission opinions concerning the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and other
examples of state practice have been consistent in the view that a successful
claim for self-determination must at least show that:
a) The secessionists are a "people;"
b) The state from which they are seceding seriously violates their
human rights; and
c) There are no other effective remedies under either domestic law
or international law. None of these prongs are satisfied in the
case of Transnistria, with the possible exception of(a).
The term "people" has been generally used in recent state practice to refer
to an ethnic group, or a "nation" in the classic, ethnographic, sense of the word.
However there are some, such as the TMRs leadership, who suggest the term
should mean something else, perhaps a group with common goals and norms.
While the norm of self-determination may evolve such that a people may be
more readily identified as merely a like-minded group, we do not find that
current state practice supports such a proposition. Regardless, deciding on a
single definition of the term "people" is not dispositive in this case, as none of
the other requirements for external self-determination are met.
Concerning the second prong, the existence of serious violations of human
rights, the argument of the Transnistrians can be organized into three main
groupings:
a) Violations of linguistic, cultural, and political rights;
b) The brutality of the 1992 War; and
c) The denial of economic rights. Taking into account the
significant changes in Moldova since 1992, none ofthese claims
is convincing today.
The actual history of Moldova since the end of the 1992 War shows that
the country has improved its respect of minority rights. In contrast, the TMR
has had a poor human rights record including a lack of due process, persecution
of religious minorities, and retaliation against political dissenters. The 1992
War itself caused 1,000 deaths, but we found that. In light of state practice, the
events of the 1992 War in and of themselves do not make a persuasive claim of
secession as a legal right. If they did, the world would be rife with secessionist
conflicts. Similarly, the economic rights claim, which is essentially about
allocation of tax revenues, does not lead to a legal right to dismember a state.
[Vol. 14:2
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This argument is really about policy, not the form of a polity. Finally, we note
that there is a general sense among commentators, opinions, and decisions, that
the human rights violations that are cited in support of a claim of secession
must be ongoing violations. Although Moldova still has many possible pitfalls
on its road to becoming a fully modem democratic state, it is clear that it is
nonetheless traveling the road in the right direction, albeit with some fits and
starts. Thus, the second prong-ongoing serious violations of human rights-is
not met.
The third prong asks whether there are any other options available besides
secession. This conflict has been frozen not so much because there are no other
options under domestic and international law besides secession, but because the
separatists have chosen to make the conflict seem intractable by repeatedly
refusing any options short of effective sovereignty for the TMR. For example,
while Moldova has sought to decrease ethnic tensions, the TMR has attempted
to exacerbate them and subsequently claim that separation is necessary in order
to avoid ethnic conflict and possibly genocide. Such "gaming the system" is
not persuasive.
We thus conclude that there is no solid basis for a claim of secession under
external self-determination. The most basic requirements for a legal claim are
not met.
The TMR as a De Facto Regime
If Transnistria is not a state, then what is it? We considered two issues:
a) the role of recognition in the process of state formation; and b) whether the
TMR is a defacto regime. There is no obligation to recognize the TMR, even
if it does have effective control of territory. Rather, it is likely that the forcible
acquisition of territory, the ongoing objections by the pre-existing state,
Moldova, and the evident reliance of the TMR on military, economic, and
political support from Russia for its survival argue against recognition andfor
nonrecognition in this case. In similar cases the Security Council and/or the
General Assembly call on UN member states not to recognize such seceding
entities. Inasmuch as the TMR has effective control over Transnistria but is not
recognized, the TMR can best be understood by using the doctrine of defacto
regimes. Such defacto regimes are treated as partial subjects of international
law. Their unique status does give rise to certain rights and responsibilities,
primarily related to acts required for the support and well-being of the
population. It may conclude agreements that are held at a status below treaties.
Besides the right to act in order to support its population, a defacto regime may
also be held responsible for breaches of international law.
While the defacto regime thus has certain rights and responsibilities, the
acts of defacto regimes have uncertain legal effect. Acts of such a regime may
2008]
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become invalid with the disappearance of the regime, for instance, if the
territory is reabsorbed into the parent state. However, the reintegrated state
after a failed defacto regime may be held liable for the acts of the defacto
regime that were part of the normal administration of the territory based on the
assumption that such acts were neutral and that the state would probably have
undertaken similar such acts. If, on the other hand, the de facto regime
becomes a state, then its acts will be binding on the new state.
The TMR and the Conversion of Property in Transnistria
At the heart of the dispute between the Government of Moldova and the
TMR's leadership is the issue of the control of the economic assets of
Transnistria. Does the TMR have the right to convert the property in its area
of effective control? If the two parts of Moldova are reintegrated, must these
decisions of the TMR be respected?
We used two theoretical frameworks to answer these questions. The first,
the concept of defacto regime, was discussed above. The second is an analogy
to the international law of the administration of occupied territories, the most
complete statement of which is found in the Fourth Geneva Convention. We
use these rules only by analogy as one might argue that the TMR actually is not
bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention. Nonetheless, we find the rules
concerning the administration of occupied territories and those concerning de
facto regimes to be useful, especially as they are also remarkably consistent as
they both draw from the same root concepts of property rights that tap all the
way down to the Roman law of usufruct, use of property by one who does not
own that asset.
Applying the international law of defacto regimes, the TMR does not have
the right to sell-off Moldovan state assets or any private property. Any such
sales face possible challenge and repudiation should Transnistria become
reintegrated into Moldova. By not only applying the conception of the TMR
as a de facto regime, but also by analogizing to the international law of the
administration of occupied territories, we find that an occupying power or its
analog:
a) May confiscate state property, other than real property, if it is
usable for military purposes or in the administration of the
territory;
b) May only administer non-military state real property without
destroying or otherwise converting the economic value of the
property; and
c) May not confiscate private property unless it is war materiel.
Based on the foregoing, the TMR's privatization program is
thus exceedingly difficult to justify. Any private party taking
(Vol. 14:2
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part in this program as a purchaser consequently does so at its
own risk.
THIRD-PARTY STATES AND SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS
The third and final main legal issue we consider is the role of "third-party"
states. States have a basic duty not to intervene or otherwise interfere with the
resolution of an internal conflict within another state. Under circumstances
where self-determination or, more clearly, external self-determination is
implicated, or where the Security Council finds that a conflict has become a
threat to international peace, then third-party states may have more freedom of
action concerning the conflict. This fundamental norm of non-intervention is
linked with concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and peaceful
coexistence. The role of third-party states is especially important in this case
as Russia and Ukraine have taken on the role of "guarantor" states, states that
have a special interest in ensuring an end to the conflict and formally commit
to devoting resources to conflict resolution. Being a guarantor puts a state into
a position in which it becomes involved in an ongoing crisis in another country,
but that state must nonetheless respect international law in its actions. The
report considers the actions of Russia and Ukraine in light of these rules of
conduct.
Russia
Russia, not least because it maintains troops in Transnistria, is not only a
guarantor, but a key player in the conflict. We consider four main issues:
a) The activities of the Russian Army and other organs of the
Russian Federation in Transnistria;
b) Economic pressure by the Russian Federation on Moldova;
c) Ties between the TMR leadership and Russian leadership; and
d) The general diplomatic stance of the Russian Federation.
The role of the Russian Army can be split into two phases: assistance
during the 1992 War and ongoing activities, including maintenance of arms
stockpiles in Transnistria. The Russian 14th Army played a decisive role in the
1992 War by intervening in the fighting on behalf of the separatists. Despite
treaty promises to demobilize and repeated Moldovan requests that Russia
remove its troops from Transnistria, the troops remain. Consequently, they
prop up the viability of the TMR and make reintegration more difficult. They
also provide materiel, expertise, and other support to the TMR on an ongoing
basis. Similarly, the Soviet-era arms stockpile under control of the 14th Army
has been used to support the TMR both directly and as a source of revenue
2008]
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through joint Russian-TMR sales of army materiel on the world market.
Moldova thus wants the immediate removal of the weapons stockpiles. Russia
has so far refused to remove the stockpiles (or the troops) until there is a
comprehensive political settlement and has also argued that the Transnistrians
will not let them remove the arms.
Besides the use of the army to either hamper the Moldovans or assist the
TMR, the second main issue is that Russia has also used economic pressure and
economic assistance as a carrot and stick. Economic pressure is generally not
barred by international law. However, such pressure on a state or assistance to
separatists may make the third-party state liable under the law of state
responsibility if its pressure would either frustrate Moldova's sovereign
privileges or would breach one of the third-party state's pre-existing commit-
ments to Moldova. In considering the present situation, there are four areas of
particular interest:
a) The use of energy prices as a carrot or a stick;
b) The increased use of tariff barriers against Moldovan goods;
c) Economic assistance to the TMR; and
d) The shared economic interests of Russian and Transnistrian
elites. Taken as a whole, there is a significant intervention on
behalf of the TMR.
On the third issue, the ties between TMR and Russian leadership, there is
ample circumstantial evidence. Smirnov, Minister of Justice Balala, and Chief
of Internal Security Vladimir Antufeyev all arrived in Moldova at the start or
since the start of the separatist crisis. The TMRs ruling elite is largely Russian
and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainian, and have Russian citizenship. They have
been granted Russian nationality. Certain members came to the TMR from
senior positions in the Russian government, particularly the Russian parliament
(Duma) and the Russian Army.
Finally, the various activities described above-the economic pressure, the
military assistance to the TMR, the energy politics-need to be understood in
light of the constant Russian rhetoric in favor of the TMR and critical of
Moldova. While we do not contend that any single activity described could
lead to state responsibility (although the troop situation may rise to that level)
we believe that these acts seen as a whole, combined with constant Russian
statements supporting the TMR and criticizing Moldovan efforts at
reintegration, form a compelling picture of inappropriate intervention by Russia




Due to its common border with Moldova-and particularly with
Transnistria-as well as the significant ethnic Ukrainian population in
Transnistria and throughout Moldova, Ukraine is a key stakeholder in the
Transnistrian conflict. Ukraine has been critical of Transnistrian separatism
and has advocated the complete withdrawal of Russian troops, but has also been
perceived (rightly or wrongly) as allowing smuggling through its territory and
possibly being open to relations with the TMR. Although Ukraine has acted in
many ways as a counterbalance to Russian influence in Transnistria, its
attentions have often been viewed by the Moldovans with a mixture of hope and
suspicion. Ukraine has made what may be a good faith effort at plotting a path
towards a solution of the crisis; however an actual final plan needs to be seen
before its legal implications can be assessed. The stricter border controls that
are currently being implemented are a necessary, though not conclusive, step
in resolving the Transnistrian crisis. Now that Ukraine has become a more
active participant in the Transnistrian crisis, its actions will need to be
monitored, as have those of Russia and Moldova, by the various stakeholders.
CONCLUSIONS
The report thus concludes:
Concerning the Status of the TMR
Attempted secessions are largely viewed as domestic affairs that need to
be resolved by the state itself. There is no right to secede as a general matter.
At most, secessions may be accepted in cases where a people have been
oppressed and there is no other option for the protection of their human rights.
In light of these rules, the TMR has not made a legally sufficient case that it has
a right to external self-determination or secession. Consequently, the effective
control of the TMR of the Transnistrian part of Moldova is that of a defacto
regime and may be viewed as analogous to control by an occupying power. The
TMR is thus limited as to what it may legally do with the territory it
administers.
Concerning the Conversion of Property by the TM?
The law of occupation recognizes that the occupying power may, as a
matter of fact, control the economic resources within a territory but, as a matter
of law, the rightful owners are the previous owners. The final disposition of the
property is not decided by the current effective control by the occupier and as
such, the occupier has the legal duty not to destroy the economic value of the
property. Any economic activities undertaken jointly with the separatists or
2008]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
insurgents by another party are at the peril of that party. There is no comfort
that such activities will be sanctioned after the final resolution of the separatist
conflict and they may, in fact, be "unwound."
In light of the rules governing de facto regimes and also the law of
occupation, the TMR's privatization program can leave investors with no
confidence that these transactions would be enforced if the TMR is reintegrated
into Moldova.
Concerning the Responsibilities of Third-Party States
Interventions by third parties are not favored and are assessed in relation
to the norms of nonintervention set out in numerous global and regional treaties
and legal documents. Sovereignty requires that a state's wishes concerning
affairs within its own territory be respected up to the point that some other core
interest of the international system is implicated. Thus, for example, the
garrisoning of troops on foreign soil is not allowed if the host state requests that
the troops leave.
Russia's activities concerning the Transnistrian situation, particularly the
intervention of the 14th Army on behalf of the separatists, the ongoing military
assistance to the TMR, the economic support of the TMR, and effectively
bargaining on behalf of the TMR using energy process and other levers of
power against Moldova, leads to credible claims of state responsibility on the
part of Russia for the continuing separatist crisis and its proximate results.
Similarly, in light of the experience with Russia, Ukraine's increased
participation in the conflict should be monitored.
[Vol. 14:2
